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I am very grateful for the comments on the pa-
per and the careful reading that went into them.
Since instrumental variables concepts and methods
have become popular in a range of substantive ar-
eas beyond economics, there have been a number
of significant contributions from other areas, and it
is useful to have the different perspectives on these
methods that these comments reflect. I will attempt
to address some of the issues raised in the comments,
but many of these comments will undoubtedly stim-
ulate new studies, as the general area of research on
causal inference in observational studies continues
to flourish.
KITAGAWA: “INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
BEFORE AND LATER”
I am grateful for the kind words by Kitagawa.
He has been doing very interesting work on test-
ing for validity of instrumental variables in recent
years (e.g., Kitagawa, 2010, 2013) that will undoubt-
edly be influential in the literature. I am also glad
that Kitagawa likes my summary of the differences
between econometric and statistical approaches to
causality as “choice versus chance.”
Kitagawa’s comments on the impact of the lo-
cal average treatment effect literature on economic
practice agree with my views. As emphasized in the
paper, the LATE concept was never intended to
change the question of interest, but to clarify what
we could learn from the data. Nevertheless, in some
cases the LATE may well be representative of a sub-
population that is of substantial interest on its own.
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Consider the draft lottery example (Angrist, 1990;
Hearst, Newman and Hully, 1986) where the com-
pliers are the men who served, or would have served,
in the military, because of their draft lottery num-
ber. Arguably, this is the group on the margin for
whom the effect of military service is most inter-
esting. Similarly, in the Angrist and Krueger (1991)
study of the returns to education using compulsory
schooling laws as an instrument, the compliers are
the individuals for whom schooling decisions are af-
fected by compulsory schooling laws, again arguably
an interesting subpopulation for educational policies
that are often targeted at those receiving lower levels
of education. Nonetheless, in general the subpopu-
lation of compliers is not chosen for its interest, but
because we can hope to learn something about them.
It is about the primacy of internal validity over ex-
ternal validity (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2002).
Kitagawa discusses instrumental variables in the
context of another example that, like the supply-
and-demand example I discuss in the paper, is a
classic one, that of the estimation of returns on in-
puts in a production function. Specifically, he fo-
cuses on the causal effect of labor inputs on output.
The starting point for an economist is exactly as
Kitagawa describes: firms do not choose input levels
randomly, but choose them optimally, for example,
to maximize profits. This leads quickly to settings
where we cannot simply regress output on inputs
if we are interested in the causal effect of input on
output. Moreover, the context in combination with
economic theory on firm behavior suggests where a
researcher might look for instruments that satisfy
the exclusion restriction, namely cost variables that
affect the choice of input levels but that affect out-
put only through their effect on input levels.
In his comments, Kitagawa also distinguishes be-
tween various objectives for the researcher. If the
goal of the researcher is what he calls “scientific re-
porting,” Kitagawa agrees with my recommendation
to report both estimates of the local average treat-
ment effect and bounds on the overall average treat-
ment effect. If, on the other hand, the goal is directly
to make a decision, say, on whether to extend the
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treatment to the entire population or not, he advo-
cates a decision theoretic approach, either Bayesian
along the lines of Chamberlain (2011), or the type
of Manski “data-alone” frequentist approach. I agree
with that, and I think the distinction between sci-
entific reporting and decision making is a useful one
to bear in mind.
RICHARDSON AND ROBINS: “ACE BOUNDS;
SEMS WITH EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS”
Richardson and Robins make two sets of com-
ments, one about bounds on the average causal ef-
fect (ACE), and one about simultaneous equations
models (SEMs).
In the discussion on bounds, they formulate four
sets of assumptions, captured by different graphical
models that allow for construction of the same set
of bounds. They relate these assumptions to their
novel Single World Intervention Graphs (SWIGs).
I find the SWIGs an intriguing approach, and one
that might help make the graphical approach more
relevant for researchers interested in causal effects.
One concern I have with the discussion of the four
sets of assumptions is that it is not clear when there
is a substantively important difference between the
assumptions. For example, I find it difficult to think
of substantive applications where the independen-
cies hold one pair at a time [Assumption (iii)], but
not joint independence [Assumption (i)].
The discussion on market equilibrium and bi-
causal models is very interesting and stimulating.
I am happy to see Richardson and Robins endorse
my interpretation of structural equations in terms of
potential outcomes. Although, as the authors point
out, this interpretation of structural equations is
not universal, in my view, partly based on con-
versations with other economists, it is the leading
one in economics. The discussions of normalization
issues that the authors refer to generally arise in
the context of estimation in settings where there
are multiple instruments. In that case, the differ-
ence between estimation methods such as limited
information maximum likelihood (LIML, going back
to Anderson and Rubin, 1948), and two stage least
squares (TSLS) matter. In the recent literature on
weak instruments, these differences have been shown
to potentially matter a great deal. Staiger and Stock
(1997) is a key paper, and Stock and Andrews (2005)
provide an overview.
Although economists routinely use the supply-
and-demand example in textbooks and teaching,
most discussions no longer explicitly discuss where
the equilibrium that is assumed arises from, making
the work in this area more difficult to access for re-
searchers from other areas than it need to be. The
model used by Richardson (1996) where the data
come from a discrete approximation to a finer recur-
sive model appears to capture well the mechanisms
researchers implicitly have in mind. See Bergstrom
(1966) for a related discussion in the older economics
literature discussing the relationship between non-
recursive (bicausal) models in discrete time and re-
cursive continuous time models.
SHPITSER: “CAUSAL GRAPHS: ADDRESSING
THE CONFOUNDING PROBLEM WITHOUT
INSTRUMENTS OR IGNORABILITY”
Shpitser is concerned that I did not discuss the
growing literature on causal graphical models. This
is a very interesting and rapidly expanding literature
that has important antecedents (Wright, 1921) that
were
influential in the economics literature, and where
Richardson and Sphitser have made major contri-
butions. However, I saw the focus of my paper on
an econometrics perspective on instrumental vari-
ables, and there graphical models do not currently
play a major role. It is an interesting question why
economists have not felt that graphical models have
much to offer them. Pearl (2013) has also raised
this question, and concludes somewhat dismissively
that: “economists are still scared of graphs.” He sees
this as an “educational deficiency,” and writes that
“This educational impairment is the main factor
that prevents economists from appreciating much of
the recent progress in causal inference” (Pearl, 2013,
page 8).
My view on the lack of use in the econometrics
literature on the graphical models is more sanguine.
I see substantial evidence that as a group economists
are willing to adopt new methods from other disci-
plines that are viewed as useful in practice. There
are many examples of this even within the area of
causal inference. The rapid adoption of the Rubin
potential outcome approach starting in the early
1990s with Heckman (1990) and Manski (1990) is
one, as is the by now widespread use of matching and
propensity score methods, and the current boom
in studies using methods associated with regres-
sion discontinuity designs that were originally devel-
oped in the psychology literature (see Cook, 2008,
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for a historical overview). In contrast, the causal
graphs have not caught on in economics. In my view
a major reason is that there have been few com-
pelling applications of causal graphs to social sci-
ence questions where the causal-graph approach has
generated novel analyses or prevented researchers
from making mistakes that other frameworks might
have encouraged them to make. A second reason
may be that some assumptions are not easy to in-
corporate in the graphical approach. Monotonicity,
which Swanson and Herna´n are particularly con-
cerned with in their comments, and which plays a
key role in instrumental variables analyses, is diffi-
cult to capture in a causal graph. See the discussion
in Imbens and Rubin (1995).
Let me flesh out the first part of this argument.
There are thousands of empirical studies in eco-
nomics where researchers use instrumental variables
methods. Implicitly, they may have a causal graph
like Figure 1 in the main paper, or Figure 1(c) in the
Shpitser comment, in mind. Often there is consider-
able discussion in a particular application whether
the two key assumptions that there is no direct effect
of Zi on Y
obs
i (no arrow from Zi to Yi, and no con-
founding of the effect of Zi on Y
obs
i (no unobserved
common cause of Zi and Yi) are plausible. In obser-
vational studies in social science, both these assump-
tions tend to be controversial. In this relatively sim-
ple setting, I do not see the causal graphs as adding
much to either the understanding of the problem,
or to the analyses. Similarly, there are thousands of
empirical studies in economics where researchers use
matching type methods based on the assumption
of no unmeasured confounders, and where implic-
itly they may have a causal graph like Figure 1(b)
in mind. Again, the assumptions underlying such
a graph are typically controversial and researchers
often put in substantial effort in arguing for the ab-
sence of unobserved confounders. In this case, again
I fail to see what using a causal-graph approach
would add in practice. Now consider a more com-
plicated setting such as the “hypothetical longitudi-
nal study represented by the causal graph shown in
Figure 2,” in the comment by Shpitser, or Figure 1
in Pearl (1995). Here, identification questions are
substantially more complex, and there is a strong
case that the graph-based analyses have more to
contribute. However, I am concerned about the rel-
evance of such examples in social science settings.
I would like to see more substantive, rather than hy-
pothetical, applications where a graph such as that
in Figure 2 could be argued to capture the causal
structure. There are a large number of assumptions
coded into such graphs, and given the difficulty in
practice to argue for the absences of one or two
arrows in instrumental-variables or no-unobserved-
confounders applications in social sciences, I worry
that in practice it is difficult to convince readers
that such a causal graph fully captures all impor-
tant dependencies. In other words, in social sciences
applications a graph with many excluded links may
not be an attractive way of modeling dependence
structures. As Andrew Gelman writes on his blog
in a discussion of graphical models and potential
outcomes, “Nothing is zero, everything matters to
some extent” (Gelman (2009)). Of course, instru-
mental variables methods do also critically rely on
the absence of particular dependencies, but my point
is that the larger graphical models such as those
in Figure 2 of the Shpitser comment or Figure 1
in Pearl (1995) with many variables and many ex-
cluded links require researchers to evaluate critically
many more of those assumptions. The causal graph
methods appear to be more suited to answering the
question whether given a complex set of conditional
independencies particular causal effects are identi-
fied, whereas in my experience in many social sci-
ence applications researchers proceed by assessing
a few conditional independencies given which it is
known particular effects are identified.
SWANSON AND HERNA´N: “THINK
GLOBALLY, ACT GLOBALLY: AN
EPIDEMIOLOGIST’S PERSPECTIVE ON
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION”
First of all, I want to commend Swanson and
Herna´n for their work on improving the reporting
the results of instrumental variables analyses (Swan-
son and Herna´n, 2013). Although many of their rec-
ommendations such as the reporting of estimates
of the proportion of compliers are routinely fol-
lowed in the economics literature (these estimates
are there often referred to as the first stage coef-
ficients in the two-stage-least-squares terminology),
these practices had not made it to the epidemiology
literature, and their work will likely improve practice
there. I am also glad to see that they do not attempt
to defend the homogeneity assumptions that would
allow for point identification of the ATE: it appears
that there is growing consensus that such assump-
tions are not realistic. There are other areas where
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there is less agreement. Swanson and Herna´n take
issue with the focus in the paper on the local aver-
age treatment effect (LATE). Whereas Kitagawa felt
LATEs were “valuable pieces of information about
causal effects” (Kitagawa, page 359), Swanson and
Herna´n take the view that “the LATE is not gener-
ally relevant to epidemiological questions” and pro-
pose to “refocus on the global ATE in the population
of interest” (Swanson and Herna´n, page 371).
In my response to Swanson and Herna´n, I want
to make three points. First, I want to correct the
record concerning my position on presenting es-
timates based on IV assumptions. Swanson and
Herna´n summarize my position in terms of “two op-
tions . . . (1) present bounds for the ATE, . . . , or (2)
present point estimates” (pages 372–373) and then
add that “of course . . . we can always do both.”
Swanson and Herna´n appear to have missed that
presenting both the bounds and the point estimate
for the LATE (which is the same as the point es-
timate for the ATE under homogeneity) was what
I in fact proposed (see also the comments by Kita-
gawa). One concern with the sole focus on the ATE
that Swanson and Herna´n appear to favor, either
directly, or in combination with tighter bounds on
outcomes, is that one may discard relevant infor-
mation. Let me expand on comments in the main
paper in this regard. Consider the following two ver-
sions of an artificial example with a dichotomous in-
strument, treatment and outcome. Let pzxy be the
population fraction of units with Zi = z, Xi = x,
and Yi = y, for z,x, y ∈ {0,1}. In the first example,
suppose p1
000
= 1/4, p1
001
= 1/12, p1
010
= 0, p1
011
= 0,
p1
100
= 1/24, p1
101
= 7/24, p1
110
= 7/24, p1
111
= 1/24,
and suppose these fractions are estimated precisely.
In this case, the fractions of compliers, nevertakers
and alwaystakers are 1/2, 1/2 and 0, the bounds
on the ATE are [−3/16,5/16], and the point esti-
mate of the LATE is −1/4. In the second example,
p2
000
= 1/6, p2
001
= 1/6, p2
010
= 0, p2
011
= 0, p2
100
= 1/8,
p2
101
= 5/24, p2
110
= 1/8, p2
111
= 5/24. In this case, the
fractions of compliers, nevertakers and alwaystakers
are again 1/2, 1/2 and 0, the bounds on the ATE are
the same, [−3/16,5/16], and the point estimate of
the LATE is now positive 1/4. Under the instrumen-
tal variables assumptions, the bounds for the ATE
are identical in the two examples, but the LATEs
are very different. In the first case, there is evidence
of a substantial negative effect for a subpopulation,
whereas in the second example one knows there is
a subpopulation for which the effect is substantial
and positive. That would appear to potentially lead
to very different substantive conclusions. Simply re-
porting bounds would miss these results.
In the second part of my response to Swanson and
Herna´n, I will discuss more explicitly the concerns
about external validity that are implicit in the dis-
cussions of the relative merits of the overall average
effect (ATE) and the LATE. Swanson and Herna´n
are interested in the ATE in the population of in-
terest, and then without explicitly saying so, assume
that the study population is representative for this
population of interest. Matters are rarely so clear
cut in practice. The study sample need not be a
random sample from the population of interest be-
cause of nonresponse, or the policy maker may be
interested in the average effect if the treatment were
to be extended to a larger population at a future
date, or were to be offered on a voluntary basis to
the general population. What the population of fu-
ture volunteers looks like may well depend on the
efficacy of the treatment according to the statistical
analysis. There are many examples where even in
randomized experiments the causal effects found for
the study population did not generalize to the pop-
ulation subsequently subject to the treatment. Once
one recognizes that even the study population may
differ from the population of interest much of the
concern with the LATE that Swanson and Herna´n
raise loses its force. My position here is again essen-
tially similar to the Shadish, Campbell and Cook
(2002) view on the primacy of internal validity over
external validity.
In the third part of my response, I will make some
comments on the monotonicity assumption. Swan-
son and Herna´n present a generic example where
the monotonicity condition is likely to be violated,
and argue that the instrument in this example is
one of the “most commonly proposed instruments
in epidemiology.” In fact, the example demonstrates
how much there is to be gained from a closer study
of the earlier econometric literature, as it was dis-
cussed in the original paper on the LATE (Example
2, page 472, Imbens and Angrist, 1994); see also Sec-
tion 5.3 in the current paper. The generic example
is as follows. The assignment of individuals to the
treatment is partly based on preferences of an ad-
ministrator (physician in the epidemiological version
of the experiment). The assignment of administra-
tors to individuals is as good as random. Different
administrators may have different preferences on av-
erage, but it need not be the case that the resulting
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instrument is monotone because the set of individu-
als who would be assigned to the treatment by one
administrator need not be a proper subset of the set
of individuals who would be assigned to the treat-
ment by a second administrator. That setting also
arises in applications of instrumental variables in le-
gal settings where the administrator may be a ran-
domly assigned judge: see Aizer and Doyle (2013)
with an application in the criminal justice system,
and Dobbie and Song (2013) with an application to
bankruptcy proceedings. It is important to distin-
guish such settings from those where the instrument
corresponds to an increase in the incentive to par-
ticipate, in which case the monotonicity assumption
is plausible. It is precisely by articulating explicitly
these assumptions and describing the role they play
that we may be able to avoid misleading decision-
making efforts.
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